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Excessive Skepticism?
Only with the greatest diffidence would any sensible person undertake a critical commen-
tary on an essay by Jon Elster about institutional innovation.1 For some years now, Elster 
has been asking incisive questions and providing subtle answers about the effects of  vari-
ous rules of  composition and decision concerning public bodies: Should a constitution be 
produced by a legislature whose members could benefit from its newly crafted provisions 
or by a separate body chosen specifically for this purpose? What are the effects of  rules of  
openness or secrecy on the conduct of  decision makers—constitution makers, legislators, 
jurors, etc.—and how do these affect the integrity of  the decision process? There is no need 
to proliferate these examples, because “Excessive Ambitions (II)” itself  contains abundant 
additional examples of  Elster’s distinctive contribution. 
Furthermore, “Excessive Ambitions (II)” begins from premises that are undoubt-
edly true. Economists and political scientists do habitually rely on inadequate causal theories. 
If  all the positive results in regression analyses in all the social science journals really did 
explain all the phenomena they aimed to explain, we would know infinitely more about all 
those phenomena than we do. To this indictment, Elster adds a dose of  wariness about the 
ability of  normative political theory “to identify good outcomes and to design institutions 
that can track those outcomes,” although I read the essay as principally a critique of  the abil-
ity of  empirical studies to specify the means to achieve admittedly worthy ends. 
From this skepticism of  social science flows Elster’s caution about institutional de-
sign and his basic decision rule: to favor the prevention of  bad results and refrain from at-
tempting the achievement of  good results. This is an across-the-board prescription that rules 
out many institutional innovations, some of  which might enhance public welfare. Foregoing 
a wide range of  possible social benefits on grounds so general is nothing like refraining from 
a particular innovation on grounds of  ignorance of  the likely, specific consequences. It is a 
very considerable moratorium that is proposed.  Although it only applies to the design of  
institutions, in my view our ignorance alone, great though it may be, does not justify such 
massive abstemiousness.
I understand and sympathize with Elster’s impulse, which resembles the physician’s 
injunction to “do no harm,” but harm can be done by inaction as well as action. In what 
follows, I articulate, briefly, the grounds for my reservations. Most of  what I have to say can 
be summarized under three rubrics.  First, the limitation to avoiding harm comes at a higher 
price than Elster suggests. Second, even in the field of  institutional design, it is not wise to 
1 Or, for that matter, on many other issues. I am, for example, an unabashed admirer of  the exceedingly bril-
liant work by Elster, Alchemies of  the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1998).
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adhere to Elster’s abstemiousness, because there is often an unattractive default position that 
will be left in place if  the decision is to do nothing.  Moreover, the criteria for judging alter-
natives to the default may be no less clear than are the criteria for choosing to do something 
that seems to be less invasive in the name of  merely avoiding harm. The very narrowness 
of  the inquiry to which Elster’s prescription leads could produce one harm in the course of  
avoiding another. Third, the distinction between avoiding harm and doing good is less clear 
than it may seem. Along the way, I will mention some other possible objections. 
In questioning Elster’s standards for action, I do not mean to imply that there are no 
occasions in intellectual life when the best formulation may not be a self-abnegating, nega-
tive one. After millennia of  struggles for a useful concept of  justice, the most useful one 
may well be a statement of  what it prevents rather than what it achieves. Ian Shapiro (2012) 
makes a very strong case for what he calls non-domination as the most serviceable state-
ment. But when it comes to particular institutions, I am inclined to think in terms of  better 
and worse, even if  we cannot get to best and worst, and even if  we are talking probabilisti-
cally, using tools that confine us to judgments “on the whole,” because we will never know 
everything we need to know and are therefore bound to make mistakes. 
Before I go any further, I want to point out an  irony and enter a caveat. 
There is irony in Elster’s odd invocation of  John Hart Ely’s Democracy and Distrust 
(1980) for limiting policy innovation to averting harm rather than promoting welfare in the 
positive sense. Ely derived his narrow conception of  judicial review from what Alexander 
Bickel (1962) had called “the countermajoritarian difficulty,” namely  the predicament caused 
by the need for unelected judges to pronounce on the constitutionality of  legislation enacted 
by elected bodies. Ely’s response was informed by an acute sense of  what was thought to be 
the fragile state of  judicial legitimacy vis-à-vis the political branches. Whether the response 
was right or wrong, it did not derive from any deficiency of  either empirical or norma-
tive knowledge.2 In addition, Ely was not arguing for any general limitation on innovation. 
Bickel’s point and Ely’s was precisely that wide latitude ought to be accorded to the so-called 
political branches to engage in as much policy change as they saw fit. The only problem that 
both writers thought they confronted was the scope of  constitutional limitations that could 
properly be placed on what the other branches did. Ely’s was an attempt to specify some 
content to those very modest limitations, so that other branches could proceed to innovate 
as widely as they wished so long as they did not run afoul of  Ely’s modest rules of  limitation. 
It is only fair to add that Elster was borrowing simply the spirit of  Ely’s method, not 
its particular source. Yet the method was not one that Ely was advocating in general but only 
for the courts in contemplating  judicial review. 
2 Although I myself   have tried to make the case that courts do not have the institutional apparatus to be 
good empiricists. Horowitz (1977).
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Now the caveat. After long and diligent inquiry, Elster is testing out the propositions 
he has advanced. After much less long and only modestly diligent consideration, so am I. 
But I am less sure of  my conclusions than it may appear. Inescapably, we are engaged in 
argumentation, which has a certain necessary rhetoric. The rhetoric should not be taken to 
mean that I think the conclusions I advance are as inescapable as the rhetoric is firm.  Just 
in case anyone in the fraction of  the scholarly community that reads this needs reminding, 
many of  the arguments are preliminary and assuredly vulnerable to rebuttal.  After all, this 
is just a commentary.  
I 
Is it really easier to avoid harm than it is to produce positive improvement? Many of  
Elster’s examples incline the reader to agree that it is. Efforts to reduce biases among deci-
sion makers have undoubtedly had, overall, salutary effects. And Elster’s arguments about 
jury secrecy and openness, as well as the benefits and costs of  secrecy and publicity at 
various stages in the deliberations of  legislatures and constituent assemblies, are exceedingly 
parsimonious and compelling. 
Yet it is possible to overinterpret the benefits. Consider Elster’s case of  the female 
juror who noticed that the plaintiff  in a personal injury case, wearing high heels, did not so 
much as wince as she stepped down from the witness stand (p. 17). This datum, adduced 
to show the benefits of  gender diversity among jurors, may or may not have proved what it 
is said to have proved about the plaintiff ’s pain. Does back pain always show up in the way 
women walk in certain shoes? Was the plaintiff  taking pain killers? Observers often draw 
inferences from small cues that turn out to be miscues. And if  that was true in the high-heel 
case, then, despite its benefits in general, the heterogeneity of  jury composition may have 
imparted a false special authority to the female juror’s observation. 
Or take a more consequential example. As mentioned earlier, for more than a decade 
and a half, Elster has been arguing that constitutions should not be made by legislatures, 
who, after all, could benefit from the provisions they choose to incorporate in the document, 
but rather should be made by a separate constituent assembly populated by members who 
will not so benefit in the future. If  all one cared about was the conflict of  interest manifested 
in the two roles of  legislator and constitution maker, this is an inarguable proposition. The 
special benefits for legislators are a form of  rent seeking that is exceedingly undesirable. But 
is conflict of  interest the only, or the most important, issue in planning for a new constitu-
tion? (I am not referring here to the particular provisions that ought, or ought not, to be 
included in a constitution, but only to constitutional personnel and process.) 
If  a constitution is to be made by a body whose members are ineligible to serve later 
as legislators, such a requirement precludes the service of  a large number of  knowledgeable 
people who might wish to serve later in the legislature. (The argument would also apply to 
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later service in the executive.)  At this level, the debate revolves around the weights attached 
to the two sets of  consequences: conflict of  interest and the exclusion of  capable people. 
But there is much more to it. In a world in which aspiring authoritarians cut constitutional 
corners or even overthrow democratic constitutions, a completely different argument comes 
into view. The experience of  making a new constitution can itself  provide practice in demo-
cratic decision making for politicians and, perhaps more important, can commit them to 
the instrument they have themselves produced, so that they will be reluctant to overthrow 
that constitution in the future. Beyond that, experience in constitution making can provide 
antagonists engaged in the constitutional process with an understanding of  each other’s 
interests, aspirations, and sensibilities that can carry over into the legislative process. I have 
recently made the argument that precisely these were the benefits of  Indonesia’s protracted, 
in-house constitutional process after the fall of  Suharto, benefits that, I have argued, could 
not have been obtained in a different process in what was then, at best, a shaky democracy 
(Horowitz 2013). So here is a case, which is unlikely to be unique, in which Elster’s approach 
of  focusing merely on avoiding particular harms, excluding as it does a full consideration of  
benefits, can itself  produce harmful results. 
II 
There is another case to be made against Elster’s argument “against positive insti-
tutional design, aimed at creating institutions that will (or tend to) produce good decisions, 
select good decision-makers, or create good decision-making bodies.” Elster points out that 
the criteria for judging goodness in these properties are often indeterminate, and sometimes 
it is impossible to know if  they have been satisfied. Let us assume that this is so. Yet, what 
is left unsaid is that there is usually no choice but to make such determinations in spite of  
the difficulties, for there are default settings to which institutions will revert if  we do not try 
to choose better ones. If  we do not attempt to decide whether one electoral system is bet-
ter than another under given conditions, it is not as if  no electoral system will be chosen. If  
there are elections, there will be a system, and it behooves us to make the best choice we can 
in the face of  our (relative) ignorance. And so on with other institutions. 
Our ignorance is real, but it is far from complete. In the case of  electoral systems, 
we know a good deal about the incentives created by various systems, and we can make 
informed, if  imperfect, on-the-whole, judgments about how politicians will react to one of  
them compared to another. And in any case, as I have said, it is not as if  there is a choice: 
there will be an electoral system.  
The same applies to another of  Elster’s illustrations of  decisions in which judgment 
needs to be suspended, in which, in other words, we need to treat the choice as if  it were a 
matter of  indifference. Not that it may turn out to be a matter of  indifference, for it may 
make a considerable difference, but the state of  our knowledge is, in his view, simply inade-
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quate to adjudicate the difference. Here I refer to whether a judge or a jury is the preferable 
decision maker in civil cases. Again, I want to suggest that our ignorance is not so complete 
as to foreclose a choice. And, of  course, again there is a default position, so there must be 
a choice made. Decades ago, England abolished the civil jury; the United States has not; 
and other countries have moved in the opposite direction, adopting juries, which they did 
not use previously (Vidmar 2000). So there are two methods of  comparison: longitudinal 
and cross-national. Now, to be sure, there are many intervening variables: in the cross-
country comparison, cultural differences, differences in the legal institutions that surround 
the judge or jury, differences in evidence, burden of  proof, and other legal rules; and, in 
the longitudinal comparison, everything that is associated with changing times. Despite all 
of  these difficulties, does it make sense to forego judgment on a matter so fundamental to 
the way justice is dispensed—a matter that, in the United States, has given rise to claims of  
lottery justice? 
Elster says that “insuperable causal problems” prevent us from deciding “whether 
judges or juries perform best in civil trails.” Here, again, the narrowness of  his criterion, 
which seems to be “truth-tracking and error-avoidance,” might appear to pre-judge the 
answer. In the United States, however, the jury has historically served as an element of  
democratic decision making (Carrington 2003). If  the difference between having a judge 
decide and having a jury decide were, cast in Elster’s terms, a matter of  indifference, the 
criteria employed would miss the aspect of  democratic participation and would not meet 
Elster’s standard of  reforms that “can’t hurt and might help” (p. 5). A change along the 
lines made in England might hurt a great deal if  made in the United States. This is another 
case in which the simplicity of  Elster’s project comes into conflict with the broader range 
of  issues relevant to the task of  institutional design. 
Elster wants to insulate decision makers from the effects of  self-interest, passion, 
prejudice, and cognitive bias—and stop there. This is, of  course, an abstemious agenda 
only if  these categories are narrowly conceived. But even if  they are, where is the evidence 
that our knowledge is more likely to extend to these categories than it is to, say, the incen-
tives of  politicians or of  judges and jurors? What reason is there to think that we know 
what works when it comes to reducing the effect of  passion any better than we know what 
would improve the use of  reason in decision making? It is hard to believe that Elster’s in-
dictment of  our considerable empirical deficiencies does not also extend to the particular 
attributes of  institutional design that he regards as open to innovation. 
III 
  Finally, on negative versus positive amelioration, there is the instability of  the cat-
egories. I am skeptical of  the distinction in general, but I shall mainly confine myself  to a 
few of  Elster’s own examples. He favors measures to promote the “active aptitude”—that 
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is, the attention to duty—of  legislators through the use of  certain prohibitions (pp. 21-
22). In what way is that a merely negative reform? Or, in a brief  mention of  the American 
constitutional convention, Elster speaks of  “discard[ing] unworkable arrangements and 
adopt[ing] feasible ones” (p. 17). Did this avoid harm or produce good results? He also 
writes approvingly of  the American constitutional rule excluding illegally obtained evidence 
as intended “to induce other agents [the police] to behave in socially desirable ways, even at 
the expense of  a good decision in the given case . . . (p. 19).” Surely, this rule does not meet 
the criterion of  a measure that “can’t hurt and might help.” Indeed, it has been an exceed-
ingly controversial rule, and the controversy has revolved precisely around the question of  
whether it is normatively good and, if  so, whether it is empirically supported. 
 These are problematic examples for the consistency with which Elster can apply his 
admonitions. Perhaps that is because negative and positive are so frequently just functions 
of  the way in which policies are described. Is an electoral change to a proportional system 
designed to promote more opportunities for small parties to win seats (positive) or to elimi-
nate an allegedly unfair seat bonus favoring large parties that is produced by the existing 
system (negative)? The two are different ways to describe the same phenomenon.   
IV 
I have just a few closing thoughts. 
If  we were to follow Elster’s advice and abstain from positive amelioration in institu-
tional design, we would lose many opportunities to ameliorate based on the identification of  
past errors. Error correction would need to wait until it was obvious that things were so bad 
that a change “can’t hurt and might help,” but by then much harm might have been done 
by a dysfunctional design. The narrow criteria for innovation build in a significant time lag, 
during which interests in the status quo may have become deeply embedded, thwarting even 
those changes that meet Elster’s criteria. Passage of  time affects the politics of  adoption. 
There is also a doubt that nags at me concerning the scope of  Elster’s field of  action 
for his prescription. If  the source of  Elster’s caution is lack of  empirical knowledge and lack 
of  normative conviction, why confine its application to the design of  institutions? Why not 
apply similar cautions to policy innovation in general? Thinking about this issue would call 
into question the narrower enterprise, too, because it would encounter the response that 
the “can’t-hurt-might-help” standard, if  employed broadly, would produce far too much 
stasis–and that, although our ignorance is great, it is not perfect. Because we do not know 
everything—and in fact know much less than most ardent partisans of  their own particular 
subject claim—that does not mean that we know nothing. And if  this is true in general, why 
is it not true of  the particular case of  institutional design?  After all, how have we discerned 
which changes can’t hurt and might help? Unless we have unfailing intuition, a rare gift, we 
know (or think we know) what can’t hurt and might help from experience with changes that 
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met that standard and with many others that did not. Why stop gaining that knowledge now? 
Is the reason that constitutional processes are so fundamentally important that they must be 
walled off  from risk taking (within reason) that is otherwise a normal part of  public policy 
innovation?   If  so, that case needs to be made.
These speculative questions, provided by Elster’s stimulating essay, incline me to end 
on a note of  agreement with the overall enterprise. There is a need for a discussion of  the 
metaprinciples of  institutional design, for proposals in this field proliferate willy nilly, with-
out serious reflection about the subject in general. Elster has begun this discussion, and at 
the moment he is practically alone in carrying it on. In this enterprise, he deserves to have 
much more company. More than that, he deserves much gratitude for setting the agenda by 
putting his own proposals out in so clearly elaborated a fashion. 
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